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Abstract
This paper uses a data-driven approach to identify the psychological factors that underlie the array of strategies that people use to
hide their deceit. Two hundred and nine participants told two lies and two truths and then completed a self-report scale that
elicited their experiences when deceiving. A factor analysis of responses produced four factors, three of which were strategic in
nature: Nonverbal behaviour control, which relates to attempts to monitor and control nonverbal behaviour when lying; Detail,
which relates to attempts to produce detailed, engaging lies; Cognitive difficulty, which relates to the cognitive difficulties
experienced when lying and their strategic consequences; and Anxiety, which relates to the negative emotions experienced when
deceiving. The results further our understanding of the psychological processes that underpin deception and suggest several
potentially fruitful avenues for future research.
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In order to improve our ability to detect deception, there is a
need to gain a better understanding of valid deception cues
and their origins. An important part of recent attempts to un-
derstand the origins of cues to deception is the study of de-
ception strategies. It has long been thought that cues to decep-
tion can emerge from liars’ strategic attempts to appear honest
(Ekman and Friesen 1969; Knapp et al. 1974; Mehrabian
1971; Sporer and Schwandt 2006, 2007; Zuckerman et al.
1981). For example, Vrij et al. (1996) found that participants’
self-reports of the extent to which they strategically controlled
their behaviour when lying were associated with a measured
decrease in their subtle movements during deception.
Improving our understanding of deception strategies is thus
a promising avenue for better understanding deception cues
and, by extension, improving accuracy in deception detection
(Granhag and Hartwig 2008).
Deception strategies have been central to deception theory
since the beginning of modern deception research. One of the
earliest descriptions of behaviour control strategies and their
impact on cues to deception was put forward by Ekman and
Friesen (1969). When outlining their theory, Ekman and
Friesen made a distinction between ‘inhibition’ and ‘simula-
tion’ strategies. Inhibition refers to attempts by the deceiver to
omit information from their deceptive message to avoid ‘leak-
age’ of information that they want to keep hidden. In contrast,
simulation refers to attempts to generate the deceptive content
of messages to create an impression of truthfulness. This can
be as simple as filling the holes in a deceptive message left by
an inhibition strategy or as complicated as creating and main-
taining complex deceptive behaviour, simulating the emotions
and generating the verbal content that the liar believes approx-
imates the behaviour of a truth-teller.
Knapp et al. (1974) mirrored Ekman and Friesen’s (1969)
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further suggestions as to how these strategies might manifest
in behaviour. In particular, they hypothesised that, in an at-
tempt to appear honest by adopting behaviours that they as-
sume are associated with truthfulness, liars might overshoot
the mark and produce a set of exaggerated behaviours which
represent a caricature of a truthful pattern of behaviour. For
example, compensating for fears that they might reduce eye
contact when lying, liars might make even more eye contact
than might somebody who was telling the truth. This category
of deception cues maps well onto those that Ekman and
Friesen predict would result from the adoption of a simulation
strategy.
In the modern literature, the possibility that liars adopt sim-
ulation strategies is usually at best given only brief acknowl-
edgement. Deception strategies are instead mainly equated
with attempts to reduce behaviour so as to inhibit the produc-
tion of cues to deception (e.g. Burgoon and Buller 1994;
DePaulo et al. 2003; Sporer and Schwandt 2006, 2007; Vrij
2010; Vrij et al. 1996). This is perhaps because deception
strategies are usually inferred from behaviour, and several
influential meta-analyses of deception cues revealed mainly
decreases rather than increases in behaviour when lying, pro-
viding evidence for ‘inhibition’ strategies rather than simula-
tion strategies (DePaulo et al. 2003; Sporer and Schwandt
2007).
Little direct measurement of strategies took place until rel-
atively recently, when a significant amount of research effort
investigated self-reported deception strategies. Recent, data-
driven research on self-reported deception strategies typically
involves participants taking part in a deception task before
describing, in response to an open-ended question, the strate-
gies they employed when lying. These self-reported strategies
are then content analysed into superordinate categories
representing conceptually related clusters of strategies. The
strategies identified by this approach are numerous and
diverse, reflecting the many ways people control their verbal
content and nonverbal behaviour. Colwell et al. (2006) pro-
duced a list of 14 categories into which participants’ self-
reported deception strategies were placed by coders, including
appearing coherent and consistent and maintaining a calm
tone of voice. Other have reported strategies such as remain-
ing calm, avoiding incriminating details, appearing pleasant
(Hartwig et al. 2007), maintaining eye contact, avoiding hes-
itations (Strömwall et al. 2006), telling an uncomplicated story
(Masip 2013) providing rich details, laughing and joking, be-
having consistently between truths and lies, and believing
one’s own lies (Strömwall and Willén 2011).
It remains unclear, however, how these myriad strategies
are related to one another. Most research simply categorises
participants’ self-reported strategies via conceptual similarity
(as judged by research volunteers), rather than by investigat-
ing how they actually co-vary with one another.
Consequently, these categories may not reflect the true
nature of the interrelationships among strategies as they oc-
cur when a person is lying. The exact nature of these strate-
gies, the constellations they form with other strategies, and
the psychological factors that underpin them have yet to be
established.
As well as improving our understanding of the interrela-
tionships among strategies, the present research also addresses
another obstacle to deception detection success: individual
differences in behaviour when deceiving. One of the reasons
why deception cues are generally weak and inconsistent is
because different people lie in different ways (Vrij 2010).
For example, in a reanalysis of data from three studies on hand
movements in deception, Vrij et al. (1997) reported that
whereas 52% of participants decreased hand movements
when lying, 48% of participants either increased their hand
movements or demonstrated no difference in the number of
hand movements between truths and lies. If deception detec-
tion proceeds on the basis of general rules, such as that decep-
tion is generally associated with a decrease in body move-
ment, then such inter-individual variation in behavioural cues
necessarily has a negative impact on deception detection ac-
curacy. However, if individual differences are taken into ac-
count - that is, if the variation in cues to deception between
liars is understood and this understanding is integrated into
veracity judgments - then deception detection rates should
improve. Previous attempts to understand individual differ-
ences in cues to deception have produced mixed results (Vrij
2010). Deception strategies represent a potentially important
source of individual differences in cues to deception.
Understanding the structure of individual differences in strat-
egy use is an important step towards a better understanding of
individual differences in cues to deception and, by extension,
higher levels of accuracy when judging veracity.
The present research examines the structure of self-
reported deception strategies. It does so by generating a
questionnaire-based measure from free reports of deception
phenomenology, and by using this measure to collect data
on what liars’ experience when they lie. These data are then
subjected to a factor analysis to identify the latent constructs
underpinning these experiences. This approach extends the
current literature in several ways. The methodology mirrors
that of previous research, but instead of subjectively
categorising strategies, we statistically examine how different
strategies co-vary. This should give a more accurate insight
into psychological (rather than purely semantic) interrelation-
ships between strategies than content analysis. Also, previous
strategies research has been criticised over the possible effect
on the content of self-reports of the instructions regarding
what aspects of strategies to report (Strömwall and Willén
2011). The current study attempts to minimise the influence
of instructions on self-reports of strategy use by examining
everything participants report thinking and feeling when ly-
ing, not just reports of strategies.
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Although this study is largely exploratory in nature, we
have several hypotheses as to the nature of the results.
First, we hypothesise that strategy use will be multidimen-
s i on a l i n na t u r e . Behav i ou r c on t r o l i s o f t e n
operationalised in the literature as a single factor
representing decreases in behaviour, and, because very
few strategies are necessarily mutually exclusive, it is in-
deed possible that it is a unidimensional construct (e.g. a
global factor of strategy effort). However, the nature of
self-reported strategies is so diverse that it seems likely
that behaviour control is multidimensional in nature.
Second, we hypothesise that the actual structure of decep-
tion strategies is not as complex as the categorisations
produced in previous deception strategy research (strate-
gies studies commonly induce over 10 strategy catego-
ries). The content of the different strategy categories re-
ported in the literature is often conceptually related, so it
is likely that a small number of broad strategy dimensions
underpin strategy use. Third, in line with previous re-
search on deception strategies, we hypothesise that the
content of the main dimensions of strategy use will reflect
two main forms of regulation: purposeful control of non-
verbal cues and regulation and manipulation of speech
content to produce plausible lies (Hartwig et al. 2010;
Strömwall and Willén 2011).
Method
Participants
Participants were 209 undergraduate students (71 males)
who volunteered to participate for either £5 or course
credit. Their average age was 20.4 years (SD = 2.59).
Materials
Post-session ‘Deception Phenomenology’ Questionnaire A
questionnaire was created to measure participants’ expe-
riences when lying. The items in this questionnaire were
extracted from the written responses of 81 participants in
two previous deception experiments to the post-session
request: ‘Please write at least a paragraph about what
was going on in your mind when you were lying.’
These two previous experiments involved participants un-
dertaking a small number of lab-based activities before
lying to an interviewer and claiming that they had in fact
taken part in several other activities as well. We asked
participants to write down everything that went on in their
minds when they were lying. A broad request such as this
should be expected to mitigate the concerns raised previ-
ously that the exact instructions given in previous strategy
research appear to encourage participants to focus on and
report specific types of deception strategy (Strömwall and
Willén 2011). This list of items was compiled into a de-
ception phenomenology questionnaire. All items generat-
ed by participants in the pilot were used in the question-
naire after repetitions and ambiguous items were removed
and after some items were altered to become grammatical,
leaving 102 items for use in the experiment. Participants
were instructed to ‘rate how frequently you experienced
the following mental phenomena when lying during the
interview’, with each item rated on 5-point scale from
Never (1) to Very Frequently (5).
Procedure
On giving informed consent, participants were taken to a table
in a nearby room where they were presented with a collection
of props that would allow them to take part in four different
activities. The activities were (i) a bird identification activity
in which participants were given a photograph of a North
American bird (randomly chosen from a pool of 150 photo-
graphs) and asked to use a bird identification field guide to
identify the bird to species level; (ii) a paper plane making
activity requiring participants to make a simple paper plane
by following an instructional, laptop-based video clip; (iii) a
picture drawing activity requiring participants to spend two
minutes drawing a picture about a set topic randomly chosen
from a pool of 100 topics; and (iv) a video activity that com-
prised watching a short YouTube video clip on a laptop ran-
domly chosen from a pool of 100. These activities were pick-
ed to capture a reasonably broad spectrum of passive and
active everyday solitary activities of varying emotional
content.
Participants were told that they should undertake just
two out of these four activities, as dictated by their in-
struction sheet. The assignment of activities varied ran-
domly both across participants and between veracity con-
ditions. They were told that, on completing the tasks, they
would go to another room to be interviewed about their
experiences. At interview, they were required to tell the
interviewer the truth about the two activities they com-
pleted and also to lie and pretend that they had completed
the other two activities. All participants thus told two lies
and two truths. The interviewer asked each participant
five questions. The first question about each activity was
a general one (‘Tell me everything you remember doing
during the activity’) and the remaining four, more specific
questions were asked in random order. The four specific
questions varied according to the activity. The interviewer
was blind to whether the participant was lying or telling
the truth, but knew that the participant would tell two lies
and two truths. At the end of the session, participants
completed the post-session questionnaire.
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Results
Structure of Deception Phenomenology
Participants’ questionnaire responses were submitted to a fac-
tor analysis to draw out the dimensions that underpin their
experiences of lying. Although factor analysis is usually
regarded as requiring large sample sizes in order to produce
reliable results, claims regarding requisite sample sizes vary
markedly and are often based on little other than the personal
experience of the proponent (MacCallum et al. 2001;
MacCallum et al. 1999). The few empirical studies that have
investigated the effect of sample size on factor recovery sug-
gest that there is no absolute sample size or item to participant
ratio that is sufficient to recover a set of population factors (De
Winter et al. 2009; MacCallum et al. 1999, 2001; Mundfrom
et al. 2005). This empirical research suggests that the most
important factor influencing the accurate recovery of popula-
tion factors is the ratio of variables to factors. If each factor is
defined by at least 6 or 7 highly loading items, then the factor
solution is almost always robust, even with sample sizes of
100–200 (MacCallum et al. 2001). This remains the case even
with low communalities (MacCallum et al. 1999; Mundfrom
et al. 2005). Because the content of the different strategy cat-
egories reported in the literature is often conceptually related,
we anticipated that the questionnaire items would be split
between a small number of consequently overdetermined fac-
tors, resulting in a factor structure robust enough to be recov-
ered with a sample size of 209.
To assess whether or not the data were suitable for this
approach, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was performed on the
correlation matrix formed by the phenomenology data and the
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy
was calculated. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant,
χ2(5151) = 13,103.02, p < .001, and Kaiser’s measure of sam-
pling adequacy was 0.78 (values of 0.5 or above generally
being held to be suitable for factor analysis; Hair et al. 1995;
Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Both tests therefore suggested
that, in line with our first hypothesis, the data were dimension-
al in nature and suitable for factor analysis.
To investigate the main dimensions of experiences during
deception, an Unweighted Least Squares (ULS) factor analy-
sis was performed with Oblimin rotation. A polychoric corre-
lation matrix was analysed because the data were ordinal in
nature, and Pearson correlations have been found to underes-
timate the strength of relationships between ordinal variables
(Olsson 1979). We used an Oblimin rotation, a form of
oblique rotation, because there was no theoretical reason to
assume that the factors would be uncorrelated.
To inform the decision as to how many factors to extract,
we conducted three statistical analyses. A parallel analysis
(Timmerman and Lorenzo-Seva 2011) suggested that 7 factors
should be extracted. However, when applied to datasets with
sample sizes well over 100 and large item to factor ratios,
parallel analysis often errs towards the over-extraction of fac-
tors (Lorenzo-Seva et al. 2011). Two alternative statistical
methods for selecting the number of common factors, reported
to be more reliable under these conditions, are the Hull meth-
od (Lorenzo-Seva et al. 2011) and the Minimum Average
Partial (MAP) test (Velicer 1976). The Hull method seeks to
identify the number of factors which represents the best bal-
ance between goodness-of-fit and the degrees of freedom.
This method suggested a two-factor solution was most appro-
priate. The MAP test suggested a five-factor solution.
Additionally, a subjective examination of eigenvalues sug-
gested that a four-factor solution was appropriate (the first
nine eigenvalues were 15.22, 14.03, 6.12, 4.27, 2.99, 2.77,
2.48, 2.31, and 2.12 respectively).
We then undertook a subjective examination of the factor
loadings. Specifically, an examination of factor loadings in 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 factor solutions suggested a four-factor
solution was most appropriate. The two-factor solution com-
prised an emotional-cognitive difficulty factor and a very
broad behaviour control factor. When 3 factors were extract-
ed, the behaviour control factor split into two readily inter-
pretable factors, one pertaining to nonverbal behaviour con-
trol, the other pertaining to attempts to create convincing lie
content. The extraction of a four-factor solution produced an
additional factor with high loadings from items pertaining to
cognitive difficulty. No further psychologically and psycho-
metrically valid factors were produced by extracting larger
factor solutions. The extraction of a five-factor solution pro-
duced an additional factor which appeared only to represent
a ‘bloated specific’ (Cattell and Tsujioka 1964)—that is, a
factor composed mainly of similarly-worded items. The
items pertained to difficulty maintaining eye contact (e.g. ‘I
found it difficult to keep eye contact’, ‘I was conscious of the
fact I kept losing eye contact’, ‘I could not look at the person
I was lying to’, ‘I tried to avoid looking at the person I was
lying to’). A six-factor solution produced an additional bloat-
ed specific with high loading items pertaining to the linking
of deceptive narratives to previous experiences (e.g. ‘I
attempted to link my lie to things I had experienced before’,
‘I linked the content of my lie to my own real-life experi-
ences in order to make it more believable’, ‘I drew on my
previous experiences in real life when constructing my lie’).
Finally, the additional factor produced by a seven-factor so-
lution was very small and had no large factor loadings (i.e.
loadings above 0.5). Consequently, and in line with our sec-
ond hypothesis that the structure of deception strategy use
would be characterised by a small number of dimensions, a
four-factor solution was adopted, which accounted for
38.9% of the variance in the correlation matrix.
Table 1 presents the item loadings from the four-factor
model. To aid interpretation, only item loadings of 0.4 or
higher are displayed.
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I tried to plead ignorance to ease the pressure of having to make up a lie 0.58
I was consciously trying to control the speed of my speech 0.53 0.42
I tried to make what I was saying as realistic as possible − 0.51
I said things during my lie which were designed to avoid further questions being asked 0.50
I tried to say that I could not remember specific details 0.49
I tried to keep a monotone voice 0.48
My mind wandered, resulting in uneasy pauses 0.48
I found it hard to keep the content of my lie consistent 0.48
I felt confused 0.44 0.42
I tried to answer as fluently as possible − 0.43
I tried not to smile or laugh when lying 0.42
I believed what I was saying even though I knew it was a lie 0.42
I could feel my body shaking 0.41
I tried to keep my body position the same as it was when I was being honest 0.72
I thought about the amount of eye contact I was making with the person I was lying to 0.67
I tried not to change anything I was doing physically from when I was telling the truth 0.67
I tried to match the style of my lies to the style of my truthful utterances 0.64
I attempted to communicate information in the same manner when lying as when telling
the truth
0.63
I was conscious of my body language 0.63
I tried to talk at a steady speed 0.62
I tried to maintain eye contact with the person I was lying to 0.61
I tried to control any ‘nervous’ actions 0.61
I tried to be calm 0.59
I tried to avoid using any body language that would indicate that I was lying 0.55
I tried to behave the same way as when I was telling the truth 0.54
I tried not to look particularly nervous 0.53
I tried to keep my body language consistent between my lies and truths 0.51
I tried to look calm 0.48
I tried to make sure that I did not contradict myself 0.48
I tried to keep still 0.45
I tried to bear in mind the signs that people give off when lying 0.45
I kept my body movements to a minimum 0.45
I tried to match the length of my deceptive responses to the length of my truthful ones 0.43
I tried to control the direction my eyes were looking 0.42
I tried to remain as natural as possible 0.41
I was so focused on what I was saying, I lost track of my body movements − 0.4
I thought it was obvious I was lying 0.83
I felt the person I was lying to would be able to tell I was lying 0.82
I felt unconvincing 0.78
I was nervous about how obvious my lie was 0.76
I was anxious because I wasn’t confident about the content of my lie 0.74
I felt anxious 0.74
I worried I would be found out 0.7
I found lying scary 0.69
I did not feel any different when lying as compared to telling the truth − 0.65
I felt that my hesitations gave me away 0.61
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Factor 1, Cognitive difficulty, represents the cognitive
difficulty experienced by participants when producing
their lies (e.g. ‘My mind wandered, resulting in uneasy
pauses’ and ‘I found it hard to keep the content of
my lie consistent’) and behavioural efforts to minimize
the impact of this difficulty (e.g. ‘I tried to say that I
could not remember specific details’ and ‘I plead
ignorance to ease the pressure of having to make
up a lie’).
Factor 2, Nonverbal behaviour control, represents deliber-
ate attempts by participants to monitor and control their
nonverbal behaviour when lying. Nonverbal behaviour
control is a relatively low-level strategy involving the








I found it hard to think quickly 0.61
I did not like lying 0.6
I stumbled with what I was saying 0.6
I found it hard to invent the details of my lie 0.57
I hoped I would not be questioned any further 0.56
I found it difficult to keep eye contact 0.56
The more I tried to elaborate on my lie the more I felt it was obvious I was lying 0.55
My heartbeat increased 0.55
I was aware that the detail in my lie was poor compared to the detail in my truthful
statements
0.54
I was conscious of the fact that I kept hesitating 0.53
I felt guilty 0.52
Sometimes I could not think of anything to say 0.5
My speech became faster 0.46
I could not look at the person I was lying to 0.46
I made relatively long pauses because I had to create a lie 0.44
I found it difficult to keep track of my body movements when lying 0.41
I found it hard to picture my lie in my head 0.41
I tried to make my lie sound natural by adding emotion 0.67
I imagined myself actually experiencing what I was lying about 0.62
I attempted to link my lie to things I had experienced before 0.62
I linked the content of my lie to my own real life experiences in order to make it more
believable
0.62
I drew on my previous experiences in real life when constructing my lie 0.59
As my lie progressed I became more creative 0.57
I tried to be humorous in order to distract the person I was lying to from paying attention to
my body language
0.56
I tried to be expressive 0.55
I tried to make up extra little details to make my lie more convincing 0.54
I tried to decorate my story with a few irrelevancies 0.52
I tried to imagine that the thing I was lying about was actually true 0.52
I made my lies seem natural by adding detail 0.47
I tried to think that I was telling a story rather than lying 0.46
I tried to give as much detail as possible in order to sound convincing 0.46
I repeated elements of my lie in an attempt to make my lie more realistic 0.46
I tried to think of details which would make my lie believable 0.44
I tried to think up answers as quickly as I could in order to sound convincing 0.41
I attempted to appear confident so that I would come across as believable 0.4
Factor loadings below .4 are not displayed
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(i.e. ‘I tried to maintain eye contact with the person I was lying
to’), speed of speech (i.e. ‘I was consciously trying to control
the speed of my speech’) and tone of voice (i.e. ‘I tried to keep
a monotone voice’). Frequently, this attempted moderation
takes the form of suppressing behaviours, such as bodymove-
ments, fast rate of speech and other nervous behaviours, which
many laypeople assume are cues to deception (Hartwig and
Bond 2011). Also, central to this factor are attempts to main-
tain consistency in behaviour between truths and lies (e.g. ‘I
tried to keep my body language consistent between my truths
and lies.’).
Factor 3, Anxiety, relates to one of the unintended phenom-
enological consequences of lying, namely the experience of
negative emotion (e.g. ‘I found lying scary’ and ‘I felt anx-
ious’). Only items related to negative emotion loaded on this
factor: no items which obviously described the positive emo-
tions associated with duping delight were associated with this
dimension. Additionally, this factor contained several items
related to the level of confidence one has in one’s lies (e.g. ‘I
felt unconvincing’). Unlike the other three factors extracted,
Anxiety does not appear to be strategic in nature.
Factor 4, Detail, reflects strategic attempts to appear truth-
ful by increasing the amount of detail, humour, and emotion
contained in one’s responses. Central to this dimension is the
high-level deception strategy of drawing on previous, real-life
experiences to make the content of lies sound more authentic
(e.g. ‘I linked the content of my lie to my own real-life expe-
riences in order to make it more believable’). Participants
scoring highly on this dimension also tended to report
attempting to directly control verbal behaviours by, for exam-
ple, making their lies detailed (e.g. ‘I made my lies seem
natural by adding detail’), adding extra emotion into their
accounts (e.g. ‘I tried to make my lie sound natural by adding
emotion’) and utilising humour (e.g. ‘I tried to be humorous in
order to distract the person I was lying to from paying atten-
tion to my body language’).
There weremoderate correlations among the four identified
factors. Table 2 presents an inter-factor correlation matrix. The
largest correlations were between Cognitive difficulty and
Anxiety and between Detail and Nonverbal behaviour control.
Discussion
Using a bottom-up approach, the current study derived three
factors of deception strategy use in a lab-based deception task.
In doing so the study clarified the superordinate factor struc-
ture that organizes the numerous deception strategies that have
been reported in the literature. As hypothesised, strategy use
was multidimensional and defined by a small number of broad
factors: a factor analysis of participants’ scores on a post-
session deception phenomenology questionnaire recovered
four phenomenology factors, three of which represented de-
ception strategies.
Deception strategy use was multidimensional, being de-
fined by three large factors. As hypothesised, the content of
the factors represented the purposeful control of nonverbal
cues and manipulation of speech content to produce plausible
lies. Indeed, one factor essentially represented the control of
nonverbal cues and another the manipulation of speech con-
tent. The factors that emerged from our analysis also fit well
with the broader deception research literature. For example,
the Cognitive difficulty factor maps on to the construct of
cognitive load, which has occupied a central position in de-
ception theory for several decades (Greene et al. 1985; Miller
and Stiff 1993; Sporer and Schwandt 2006; Vrij et al. 2008;
Zuckerman et al. 1981). Although the factor was defined
mainly by items pertaining to the experience of cognitive load,
it was also defined by items describing deliberate efforts to
account for such difficulties. The strategic element was rela-
tively small and focussed on attempts to say as little as possi-
ble, for example by claiming a lapse of memory.
Similarly, the Nonverbal behaviour control factor re-
ported here fits well with the modern conception of be-
haviour control in the research literature (e.g. Sporer and
Schwandt 2007; Zuckerman et al. 1981). Behaviour con-
trol is generally considered to focus on attempts to sup-
press the increases in behaviours thought by most people
to index deception. In the present study, the factor was
defined by items such as ‘I tried to control any nervous
actions’, ‘I tried to keep still’, and ‘I tried maintain eye
contact with the person I was lying to’. The emergence of
this factor in the present research mirrors the results of
previous deception strategy research (Hartwig et al.
2007; Masip 2013; Strömwall et al. 2006; Strömwall
and Willén 2011) and supports the central position of this
type of behaviour control strategy in deception theory.
Perhaps the most interesting factor to emerge from the
study was the strategy dimension, ‘Detail’. The emergence
of this factor is in line with several previous studies which
have reported that producing detailed lies is one of the main
deception strategies reported by lairs (Hartwig et al. 2007;
Strömwall et al. 2006; Strömwall and Willén 2011). This fac-
tor differed from the preceding in several ways. First, it ap-
peared to be mainly verbal in nature, focussing on the fluent
Table 2 Inter-factor correlation matrix
Factors 1 2 3 4
1. Cognitive difficulty –
2. Nonverbal behaviour control − 0.02 –
3. Anxiety 0.25 0.03 –
4. Detail − 0.15 0.3 0.01 –
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and confident delivery of a detailed deceptive message.
Second, whereas some of the content of the Nonverbal behav-
iour control factor related to attempts to suppress behaviour,
many of the items with high loadings on the Detail factor
pertained to attempts to increase behaviour, in the form of
adding extra details to deceptive messages.
Another important difference between these two behaviour
control dimensions was the latter’s mix of both strategies that
directly control behaviour and indirectly control behaviour.
Whereas all the items loading highly on the Nonverbal behav-
iour control factor described direct attempts to control specific
behaviours such as gaze, facial expression and speed of
speech, the Detail factor was defined by several items
pertaining to the strategy of indirectly influencing behaviour
by utilising previous experiences in the construction of lies.
The importance of this strategy has been highlighted by recent
research. In a study on self-reported deception strategies,
Leins et al. (2013) found that reporting previous experiences
was the most widespread deception strategy used by partici-
pants. The results of the present research provide further sup-
port for the importance of this strategy. Another, similar strat-
egy contained within the Detail factor was self-deception.
Participants attempted to make their lies more naturalistic by
convincing themselves that what they were lying about was
actually true. This finding is in line with modern theories of
self-deception, which suggest that one of the reasons self-
deception evolved was to produce more convincing lies in
the face of ever more proficient human lie detectors (von
Hippel and Trivers 2011). The Detail factor represents a type
of behaviour control strategy that has been relatively
neglected in the deception literature and should be the focus
of further research attention.
Interestingly, the latter two strategy factors were correlated.
People who attempted to control their nonverbal behaviour
also tended to try to add detail and expressiveness to their
deceptive accounts. Indeed, the relatively large values of the
first two eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix sug-
gested that a two-factor solution might best represent the
structure of the data, with one of the factors representing a
general ‘behaviour control’ factor. However, there is a signif-
icant pragmatic benefit to adopting a multidimensional rather
than unidimensional representation of deception strategies.
The different strategy factors might be expected to have very
different effects on nonverbal cues to deception: adding extra
details should result in an increase in nonverbal behaviour, for
example through increased gesture production, whereas in-
creased nonverbal behaviour control should result in a de-
crease in nonverbal behaviour. Consequently, the content of
a single strategy superfactor would be heterogeneous in terms
of the effects it has on cues to deception, making it of limited
value in an applied context.
The fourth factor, Anxiety, was not strategic in nature. It
represented the negative emotions experienced when lying.
Furthermore, the pattern of correlations between this factor
and the strategy factors suggests that anxiety does not strongly
impact on strategic behaviour when deceiving. Its emergence
is almost certainly a result of the breadth of request given to
the participants who generated the questionnaire items: they
were asked to report all aspects of deception phenomenology,
not just strategies. However, the emergence of this factor
should be of interest to deception researchers. The positive
correlation between the Anxiety and Cognitive Difficulty fac-
tors serves as a reminder that these two phenomena co-occur
in a deception context. Anxiety directs cognitive resources
away from executive processes and towards the perception
of threatening stimuli (McNaughton and Corr 2008; Vytal
et al. 2012). In the context of deception, increased anxiety
when lying would be expected to reduce the cognitive re-
sources that participants are able to direct towards the task of
creating a lie. Conversely, it is also feasible that experiencing
cognitive difficulty when creating lies could have been a
source of anxiety for liars, further strengthening the connec-
tion between these two constructs in the present research (Vrij
and Granhag 2012).
The results of the present study may help inform attempts
to improve deception detection performance in at least three
ways. First, the efficacy of veracity judgments based on clus-
ters of cues may be a function of how well those cues cover
the four different experience dimensions reported by partici-
pants. When the coverage is reduced to one or two of the
identified dimensions then we would predict lower accuracy
in veracity judgements than when all four dimensions were
represented.
Second, the factors identified in this study suggest different
ways in which interview tactics can make lying more difficult.
To date, most research has focused on developing methods for
increasing cognitive difficulty, yet the explication of the dif-
ferent dimensions suggests other foci may be possible. For
example, it might be possible to increase the magnitude of
cues to deception stemming from the nonverbal behaviour
control strategy by increasing the salience of the extent to
which liars have their body movements observed. Such a per-
ceived increase in scrutiny should, providing there is differen-
tial use of the strategy between liars and truth-tellers, amplify
cues to deception arising from the controlled suppression of
body movements.
Third, the factors reported in the current study might help
to improve deception detection by defining new individual
differences variables for investigation in the context of decep-
tion. Indeed, compared with personality traits, the factors re-
ported here would be expected to have a direct influence on
the production of cues to deception, so an argument can be
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made that this is the best level at which to understand and
investigate individual differences in deception cues. To further
investigate the suitability of the four factors as individual dif-
ferences variables, future research should examine the stabil-
ity of liars’ standing on the factors across deceptive situations.
Several limitations of the present research are worth noting.
First, it is worth highlighting the reliance of this study on self-
reports. Humans can be limited in their capacity to accurately
self-report on their behaviours (Fiske and Taylor 2008; Nisbett
and Ross 1980; Nisbett and Wilson 1977). However, self-
reports are almost certainly a more valid way of measuring
explicit deception strategies than behavioural observation. It
would be difficult to imagine how a researcher could accurate-
ly infer the use of a strategy such as ‘I imagined myself actu-
ally experiencing what I was lying about’ or ‘I attempted to
link my lies to things I had experienced before’ by objectively
measuring behaviour. Consequently, self-report methodology
forms the backbone of modern research on deception strate-
gies (e.g. Clemens et al. 2013; Colwell et al. 2006; Hartwig
et al. 2007; Leins et al. 2013; Masip 2013; Strömwall et al.
2006; Strömwall and Willén 2011; Vrij et al. 2010). Even one
of the most famous critiques of the self-report method sug-
gests that the data produced from self-reports are more valid
than information from external observations when it comes to
‘emotions, evaluations, and plans’ (Nisbett and Wilson 1977,
p. 255). Indeed, in the context of deception strategies, previ-
ous reports of significant correlations between self-reports of
behaviour control and behaviour when lying (Vrij et al. 1996)
suggest that self-reports of deception strategies possess at least
some validity. It remains possible though that parallel, uncon-
scious strategies are at play in deceivers’ minds which are
unavailable to introspection, and so not directly measurable
by self-report.
Second, it remains unclear whether the factors reported will
generalize across different types of lie, including those in ap-
plied forensic contexts, where lies would be expected to be
more self-motivated and include denials of having done some-
thing. Such lies stand in contrast to those produced in the
present study, where liars simply claimed to have done some-
thing that they had not. This is an empirical question and
future research should investigate the replicability of the de-
ception factors across different types of lie. However, the fac-
tors are relatively broad in terms of content and are conse-
quently of relevance to many deceptive situations, so it is
expected that they will demonstrate a high degree of replica-
bility across deception contexts. Furthermore, research on of-
fenders’ self-reported deception strategies suggests that the
strategies used by prisoners in interrogations overlap signifi-
cantly with those of students taking part in lab-based decep-
tion studies (Strömwall and Willén 2011). However, it is ob-
vious that a different set of factors will underpin lies perpetrat-
ed in other modalities, for example in online communication,
where nonverbal behaviour is often irrelevant. Future research
should establish how stable the three strategy factors reported
here are across deception type, context and modality.
Third, the present research examined only deception strat-
egies; it did not investigate the strategies employed by truth-
tellers. It is possible that one or more of the three broad de-
ception strategy factors reported here also represents one of
the main factors organising the strategies of truth-tellers dur-
ing interviews. Future research should investigate whether
such a potential overlap exists between liars’ and truth-tellers’
strategy factors. Cues to deception would be expected to be
most pronounced when they relate to factors where there is no
counterpart in truth-tellers. However, it should be noted that
even an overlap between truth-tellers’ and liars’ strategies
could produce cues to deception if liars’ behaviour is affected
by that strategy factor more (or less) strongly than truth-
tellers’.
Fourth, most factor analyses account for a greater percent-
age of variance in the data than the factor analysis conducted
as part of the present research. The four factors extracted
accounted for 38.9% of the variance in scores on the deception
phenomenology questionnaire. In a meta-analysis of the
amount of variance accounted for in factor analysis,
Peterson (2000) reported that factor analyses with 31 or more
items on average accounted for 48.1% of the variance in the
correlation matrix. In contrast to most factor analyses, our data
were not pre-structured to increase the value of the loadings on
the resultant factors, and, by extension, increase the amount of
variance accounted for by the factor solution. Moreover, our
factor analysis was conducted on a relatively large number of
items (102) and the greater the number of items in a factor
analysis, the less variance any given number of factors will
account for (Peterson 2000). For both of these statistical rea-
sons, it should be expected that the present factor analysis
would produce a solution which accounts for less variance
than most.
Conclusion
Using a data-driven, factor analytic approach, this study
reported three broad factors representing the main strate-
gies participants used when lying. One factor, pertaining
to strategic attempts to control nonverbal behaviour,
mapped onto the way behaviour control is usually
conceptualised in the deception literature. A second factor
mapped onto the construct of cognitive load, representing
the cognitive difficulty experienced when lying and the
strategic behaviours produced to cope with it. A third
factor, defined by attempts to increase the detail, emotion,
and humour in lies, was particularly noteworthy and rep-
resents a construct in deception research especially wor-
thy of further investigation.
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